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A recent set of articles in Choices identified some of the major issues facing agricultural 
cooperatives.  Among these are the challenges related to identifying the financing activities and 
equity capital management strategies that will lead to growth and longevity of cooperatives 
(Barton, et al 2011).  Like their investor-owned counterparts, cooperatives must be profitable and 
competitive in the markets they face. However, cooperatives face unique challenges in managing 
equity capital.  Because they are limited in their access to outside investments and have 
nontradable stock, cooperatives rely on member-provided equity through voting shares and equity 
accumulation through the allocation of profits as retained patronage as the primary sources of 
equity.  Thus, a number of theoretical and empirical investigations identify that cooperatives are 
constrained in their ability to access capital and, therefore, are limited and perhaps inefficient in 
their investment activities.1   
This paper seeks to examine the issue of capital constraints on U.S. agricultural supply 
and grain cooperatives and investor-owned firms (IOFs).   A variant of the DuPont model – a 
technique that breaks down a firm’s rate of return to equity into measures that relate to 
profitability, efficiency in asset use, and leverage – permits an empirical comparison between 
IOFs and cooperatives on their activities, debt structure, equity, and liquidity factors. Using firm-
level panel data of financial information for cooperative and IOF agricultural grain and supply 
firms in Iowa, the two ownership types are compared to identify whether significant differences 
exists in their investment activities and financial efficiency.  Whether capital structure is impacted 
by firm type and the financial determinants which may contribute to such differences is 
highlighted.    
 
Evidence of Capital Constraint in Cooperatives 
 There is little reason a priori to expect that a cooperative firm’s capital needs are 
different from a non-cooperative firm’s needs if the two firms are otherwise similar in function 
and size and operate within similar market economies (Cobia 1989).  “Cooperatives are not 
immune from market forces.  They must meet the same market test that investor oriented firms 
meet” (Ginder 1999).  However, cooperative finance outcomes and their choices in meeting 
financing needs are purported to be unique from non-cooperative firms.  In particular, 
cooperatives may be constrained in acquiring sufficient risk capital to finance investments which 
1 Chaddad and Cook (2002) provide an excellent discussion of the mechanisms by which cooperatives are financially 
constrained and the relevant theoretical and empirical investigations. 
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may in turn limit their growth and ultimately their competitiveness.  The essence of this 
uniqueness derives from a number of defining characteristics of cooperatives:  they operate with 
the “user-owner” principle; there is an implied obligation to pay out accumulated allocated equity 
to members; they face special tax consequences for profits distributed on the basis of use; and 
investment, financing, and operational choices may not be driven by profit maximization as the 
primary objective as it is with IOFs. Whether and the extent to which these characteristics imply 
relatively higher or lower reliance on debt by cooperatives remains unsettled in previous 
theoretical and empirical literature.   
 
Theoretical Underpinnings 
 In cooperative theory, discussions of capital structure and access to capital are typically 
motivated by recognition of the “user-owner principle” of cooperatives and the practical 
implications of it on equity and financial management decisions.  An examination of the literature 
reveals, however, that whether this results in a higher or lower reliance on debt financing relative 
to the IOF counterpart is unclear.   
The user-owner principle of cooperatives reflects the requirement that cooperatives are 
capitalized by and operated for the benefit of its users.  In the case of agricultural cooperatives, 
ownership requires that users have agricultural production at risk.   The decision to use a 
cooperative is a joint decision by the producer to both use it and invest it in, where the investment 
is the purchase of the membership stock and also a retained allocation of the profits in the form of 
equity.  Thus, this principle  not only limits the potential pool of investors – those who contribute 
equity to the business must also patronize the business – but also limits the rate at which equity 
can be acquired.  In a cooperative, equity is built through the allocation and retention of the co-
op’s profits to its members. An agricultural supply or grain marketing firm operating as an IOF 
can solicit investors without the requirement to buy products or deliver grain and does not rely on 
equity accumulation through profits.  Thus, the user-owner principle creates a capital constraint, 
further implying that co-ops’  short-term investments and perhaps longer-term ones, too, must 
rely more heavily on debt than do IOFs (Lerman and and Parliment 1990). Furthermore, members’ 
equity in a traditional cooperative is non-marketable, non-transferable, and does not appreciate 
through changes in market values. The illiquidity of equity exacerbates the problem of equity 
financing if members, or potential members, do not view the cooperative as an attractive 
investment. Farmer members may view the investment in a cooperative as having a high 
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opportunity cost given the money they contribute to the cooperative could alternatively be 
invested in their own operations (Soboh, Lansink and Van Dijk 2012).  Illiquid equity also creates 
a horizon problem, reducing the incentive for older members who may soon retire from farming 
to support investments in long-term projects when the benefits from the investment will accrue to 
those who use (patronize) the cooperative in the future  (Porter and Scully 1987; Knoeber and 
Baumer 1983; Cook and Iliopolos 2000). 
 The user-owner principle also has implications for a cooperative manger’s attitudes 
towards and propensity to take-on risk. Cooperative managers may view the cooperative principle 
of risk sharing and mutual responsibility as an insurance policy, prompting them to assume more 
risk and borrow more heavily than managers of IOF firms (Lerman and Parliament 1990; 
Gentzoglanis 1997).  As a result, cooperatives may be less discriminating in their investments 
than IOFs causing an overinvestment in assets and lower asset efficiency in generating profits. 
 While certain features of the cooperative business form imply a greater reliance on debt 
capital to finance investments relative to IOFs, other features suggest the contrary:  that 
cooperatives will rely more heavily on equity than debt to finance growth. The user-owner 
principle creates an implied obligation to return a co-op’s profits to members.  This happens in 
two ways.  First, current patrons are allocated a portion of the current year’s savings (profits) 
proportional to their individual use. The co-op pays a portion of this as cash to the patron-member 
and a portion is allocated to the member but retained as cooperative equity.  A member’s equity 
accumulates over time as s/he uses the cooperative but will be redeemed out to the member at 
some time in the future.  In the eyes of potential lenders, equity from retained patronage is likely 
viewed as a liability since it has an implied maturity date, albeit somewhat vague.  The illiquidity 
of member equity and the uncertainty surrounding the timeframe for retiring member equity in a 
traditional cooperative has implications for management as well.  “Perhaps the most attractive 
feature of the method of capitalization is the fact that it capitalizes the cooperative with money 
that the member would never have received had he or she done business with a non-cooperative 
firm rather than the cooperative…equity in a cooperative has been called, ‘found money’” 
(Ginder 1999, p 2).  Members do not expect a direct appreciation of their equity investment, so 
managers may treat this portion of equity as a costless source of capital and members’ incentive 
to monitor management’s use of it may be weaker, leading both to ignore the opportunity costs of 
capital (Lerman and Parliament 1990).  If the opportunity cost of this capital is not realized, 
reliance on equity financing may be greater than in an IOF where stock is valued based on 
expectations and management outcomes.   
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 Even absent constraints on borrowing, cooperatives might rely more on equity than debt 
capital due to the differential tax treatment of profits in cooperatives relative to IOFs.  Profits in 
an IOF are taxed at the entity level and any profits passed to owners through stock dividends are 
taxed again at the individual level. Most profits in a cooperative are taxed only once – at the 
cooperative level or member level – depending on how the profits are distributed.  The 
Modigliani-Miller theory of capital structure implies that the pass-through single taxation of 
earnings reduces the incentive for co-ops to maximize debt financing as compared with IOFs 
(Caves and Peterson 1986) .  IOFs use the cost of debt financing to reduce their taxable income 
but cannot do the same with dividends paid to stockholders.  Cooperatives deduct both the cost of 
borrowing and the profits distributed to patrons from taxable income, creating an additional 
incentive for equity financing particularly when members and management do not assign the 
appropriate value or cost of equity capital. 
 Finally, differences in financing behavior and performance stem from differences in 
business objectives of cooperative and non-cooperatives (Lerman and Parliament 1993; Akridge 
and Hertel 1992; Soboh Lansink and Van Dijk 2012).  Cooperatives must be profitable; however, 
it is unclear whether cooperatives are managed to strictly maximize profits or rather that boards 
and management target multiple objectives that include maximizing patronage payments, optimal 
net prices to producers, maximizing value to members, and maximizing quantities of products 
sold and marketed.  The objective(s) will influence financing behavior, albeit in ambiguous ways.  
If the co-op positions itself in the “purest” sense of a cooperative, acting as an extension of the 
farm, then it will maximize members’ on-farm profits, leading to lower profitability, slower 
equity accumulation and, ceteris paribus, a greater proportional use of debt financing.  If instead 
the cooperative is on the other end of the spectrum and behaves like s a profit-maximizing firm, it 
allocates profits as unallocated equity, total equity accumulation is enhanced, and investments are 
financed proportionally by equity.    Cooperatives likely place different weights on the varied 
objectives, and even so, this may not necessarily lead to differences in capital structure between 
cooperatives and IOFs.  Instead, we note that differently structured firms have different objectives, 
and even if the capital structure achieved is not different, the mechanism by which is happens 
may be.   
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Empirical Evidence 
  The theories of cooperative capital structure provide reasons why one might expect a 
higher reliance on debt capital in some cases and a lower reliance in others.  Moreover, that 
cooperative firms have different objectives and the ability to pursue profit maximization suggests 
the possibility of no difference in capital structure, only a difference in the mechanism by which 
the resulting capital structure is achieved.  The ambiguity in capital structure from cooperative 
theory suggests that a cooperative debt usage relative to IOFs is largely an empirical issue.   
 Evidence from existing studies of cooperatives relative to their counterpart investor-
owned firms is inconclusive on the question of differences in capital structure.  Several studies 
fail to find significant differences between the performance of cooperative and similar IOFs.  
Lerman and Parliament’s (1990) analysis of capital structure in a sample of dairy firms finds debt 
to asset ratios are not significantly higher for cooperatives relative to IOFs.  A later study by these 
same authors finds cooperatives finance about half of investment in assets with equity, roughly 
the same as IOFs between 1973 and 1983, but significantly higher than IOFs after 1984, when 
IOFs reduced equity financing and used more long term debt financing (Lerman and Parliament 
1993).  Chaddad, Cook and Heckelei (2005) test for the presence of financial constraints in 
cooperatives using panel data for U.S. agricultural cooperatives from CoBank by examining the 
sensitivity of investment in physical assets to cash flow.  The key hypothesis is that investment 
should not be a function of cash flow if cooperatives do not face financing constraints; yet the 
authors do find a positive and significant effect of cash flow in investment.  In comparison, cash 
flow does not affect investment in a comparable sample of IOFs in the food manufacturing 
industry. 
 Other studies find evidence that cooperatives tend to use relatively more debt than 
investor-owned firms.  Gentzoglanis (1997) examines 12 large Canadian dairy firms – half 
cooperatives and half IOFs – from 1986 – 1991 and finds that cooperatives use significantly more 
debt than IOFs.  Moller, Featherstone and Barton’s (1996) study of the sources of financial stress 
in a sample of grain and supply cooperatives estimates that in roughly half of cooperatives 
experiencing financial stress, the stress stemmed from leverage or interest rate problems.  This, 
they conclude, “suggests that these cooperatives may not be using an optimal capital structure” 
(Moller, et al p. 50). 
The inconclusive nature of the theoretical and empirical evidence of capital structure 
differences between cooperatives and IOFs suggests that there is need for more studies on this 
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topic. We revisit this question of differences in capital structure using a panel data set of 
cooperative and investor-owned firms in the grain and supply industry in Iowa.    Restricting our 
analysis to a common industry and common geographic area limits the extent to which any 
differences in capital structure are due to heterogeneous market conditions.  The panel nature of 
the data is also an advantage of this study, since it allows us to control for time invariant 
unobserved firm level characteristics.  
 The DuPont Profitability linkage model is used to decompose the return on equity ratio 
into a product of asset turnover, profit margin, and leverage ratio.  DuPont Analysis is widely 
used in the financial world to help analysts identify the impact of managerial decisions on 
financial performance and interactions among important financial/efficiency ratios (Barnard and 
Boehlje 2006).  The DuPont model has been introduced in the agricultural economics literature, 
mainly as a diagnostic tool to understand the drivers of profitability.  It allows researcher to 
identify which operational activities could be improved (Melvin et al).  Theoretical contributions 
to this topic have included analyzing the relationship between a firm’s decisions and capital 
structure (Collins 1985) and the linkage between a firm’s production and investment decisions 
(Gabriel and Bake 1980).  Featherstone et al. (1988) draw on Collin’s model to assess the impact 
of farm policies on farm financial leverage, while Mishra, Moss and Erickson (2009) and Mishra 
et al (2012) apply a DuPont expansion to analyze differences in rates of return on equity and key 
profitability drives across regions and time at the farm level.  In this paper we utilize DuPont 
techniques to examine and compare the impact of important financial ratios on the capital 
structure of the cooperative and investor owned firms.  
Methodology 
Determinants of Capital Structure 
Collins (1985) derives the optimal capital structure (debt to asset ratio) for a farm 
enterprise using the DuPont identity and an expected utility maximization framework in which 
the objective is to maximize the expected return on equity.  Following Collins (1985), we assume 
that cooperatives and IOFs choose the level of leverage given their equity positions. Patrons of 
cooperatives are also the owners, thus, the different ownership structures of cooperatives and 
IOFs  may give rise to different operational and financing strategies. In reduced form, the optimal 
capital structure, δ* is a function of the expected return on assets E(Ra), the variance of the 
anticipated return on assets (𝜎𝑎2), the interest rate on debt (i), and risk aversion (𝜌): 
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 𝛿∗ =  𝛿(𝐸(𝑅𝑎), 𝑖,𝜌,𝜎𝑎2)        (1) 
Following the DuPont expansion method, 𝑅𝑎 can be further decomposed into a measure 
of operating efficiency (profit margin) and asset efficiency (total asset turnover) as follows: 
𝑅𝑎 = 𝜋𝐴 = 𝜋𝑆 ∙ 𝑆𝐴 ,     (2) 
where π denotes profit (gross revenue minus the cost of production) and S is sales revenue;  profit 
margin is defined as the ratio of profit to sales   �𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 = 𝜋
𝑆
  � ; and asset turnover is  𝐴𝑇𝑂 = 𝑆
𝐴
. 
Although increase in either operating efficiency or asset efficiency will result in higher return on 
asset, profit margin and asset turnover are purported to have different information about the 
company in the view of analysts. In particular, profit margin generally reflects the cost efficiency 
in firm’s operating process especially in the agricultural grain industry. This is because crops can 
be viewed mostly as homogenous and company doesn’t have much pricing power. On the other 
hand, asset turnover reflects a company’s marketing effort in generating sales without increasing 
asset size. Thus a higher asset turnover would require hiring more sales person or engaging in 
media advertisement etc, which in turn lead increase in variable cost. Overall, a company is 
unlikely to have both high profit margin and high asset turnover.  
 Substituting (2) into (1) the optimal capital structure is given by: 
𝛿∗ =  𝛿(𝐸(𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛),𝐸(𝐴𝑇𝑂), 𝑖,𝜌,𝜎𝑎2).     (3) 
The optimal capital structure is a function of expected values of profit margin and asset turnover, 
cost of debt, and risk and decision- maker preferences. In Collin’s study, he concludes that factors 
that increase expected return on asset shall leads to an increase in firm’s leverage, i.e. margin and 
ATO have positive impacts on 𝛿∗; On the other hand, high level of interest rate, risk aversion and 
business risk tend to reduce firm’s use of debt financing. Note that Collin's study assumes that a 
farm enterprise is an expected utility maximizer of profit which may not be true for co-ops.  In 
other words, we are unsure if optimal capital structures for firms with different organizational 
structures differ from each other. Then the signs of right hand side variables derived from his 
model, may not universally apply to either co-ops or IOFs. For instance, an increase in profit 
margin indicates increased efficiency in converting revenue to profit and expense management.  
A higher asset turnover ratio is associated with shorter cash conversion cycles. Both allow firms 
to service more debt, suggesting a higher debt-to-asset, but also may be used to pay down existing 
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debt, reducing the amount of leverage. Thus, the expected impacts of profit margin and asset 
turnover ratio on capital structure are ambiguous.  
  While not explicitly in Collin’s (1985)  model, liquidity is an important determinant of 
debt financing needs in practice, and a firm’s liquidity likely has implications for capital structure. 
Gabriel and Baker (1980) show that liquidity serves as a risk management tool to offset a cash 
shortage in the case of a negative shock to the business.  Current assets are those that can be 
converted to cash most quickly and the relative size of these assets signals a firm’s ability to meet 
their debt obligation.  Therefore, we include in the empirical specification a ratio of the value of 
inventory to current assets as the liquidity measure.  The inventory carried by farm supply and 
grain cooperatives includes things such as grain, fertilizer, chemicals, fuel, and other readily 
salable products.  Because this type of inventory is less liquid than the other current assets – like 
cash reserves – a large inventory relative to current assets indicates the need of firms to borrow 
more current debt to finance the short term operations.   
Empirical Strategy 
In this section, we discuss the empirical models used to understand the key financial 
characteristics with reference to equation (3) that differentiate co-ops from IOFs and how these 
operating factors may contribute to the difference in capital structures between co-ops and IOFs, 
if there is any.   
To identify the effect that firm type – cooperative or IOF – has on capital structure and 
also the firm-specific effects on financial performance measures we use a random effects Feasible 
Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation strategy to control for firm specific effect and 
heterokedasticity. For each of the financial measures, the random effects treatment is given by:  
   𝐹𝑗,𝑡𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 +  𝜇𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗𝑡,    (4) 
where 𝐹𝑗,𝑡𝑘  is financial ratio k for firm j at time t; 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 is a binary variable which takes a value of 
1 if the firm is a cooperative and 0 otherwise,  𝜇𝑗  are firm-specific unobserved time invariant 
effects that capture the difference in firm j’s average measure from the average of other firms of 
the same type. 2 Our sample consists of firms selected randomly from the population of grain and 
marketing firms in Iowa; therefore, we assume 𝜇𝑗 is uncorrelated with firm’s organizational 
2 We do not include time dummies as we are focusing on short panels. The consistent estimator is only asymptotically 
more reliable when T is large.   
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structure that has the similar business function. The remaining disturbance is denoted  𝜉𝑗𝑡 and 
satisfies the standard i.i.d. assumption. The conditional difference in the financial measure 
(variable) between co-ops and IOFs in the sample is captured by the coefficient 𝛾𝑘.  
The general random effects FGLS method described above is further used to identify 
which, if any, of the financial performance measures that impact capital structure vary by firm 
type.  Using equation (3) as the basis for our empirical specification along with liquidity measure 
as an additional explanatory variable, the optimal capital structure equation is given:  
  𝛿𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐸(𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡)𝑘≠0 + 𝜌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,            (5) 
where 𝛿𝑗,𝑡 is firm 𝑗′𝑠 capital structure at time 𝑡; 𝜌𝑗 captures the unobserved individual specific 
attributes including business risk and firm’s attitude towards risk and 𝜀𝑗 is a standard error term.  
𝐸𝑡−1(𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡) is the expected value of financial covariate k for firm j at time 𝑡 and  we assume it 
takes a naïve expectation form given by : 
              𝐸𝑡−1(𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡) = 𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1.                                                                            (6) 
However, inventory-to-current-asset ratio (𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑡), a measure of firm’s inventory management 
efficiency enters contemporaneously with the debt-to-asset ratio. Unlike the other financial 
measures used, the inventory-to-current-asset ratio is not an explicit part of the DuPont 
decomposition method and likely not a measure the manager or board reviewing the firm’s 
financial performance would consider when formulating capital structure needs.  However, it is 
an operational factor that impacts the debt usage of grain and farm supply firms throughout the 
operating year. Endogeneity is a concern if firms anticipate and seek to take advantage of 
inventory changes by increasing or decreasing short-term borrowing to meet inventory goals.  To 
overcome this potential source of endogeneity, the Hausman and Taylor 2SLS estimator (1981) is 
used and inventory is instrumented using the measure inventory to current asset ratio (IC). 
Endogeneity often remains a concern in an estimation strategy based on the DuPont 
deconstruction of the rate of return on equity because the DuPont model is based on an identity, 
and by the construction, at any time period t,  each of the financial measures in the model are 
determined simultaneously and highly correlated. There is also no good instrumental variables 
given all firms in our sample were located in the same geographic area and prices faced by each 
individual firm are unknown. By taking the naïve expectation form of financial covariates as 
shown in equation (6), endogeneity of the covariates is partially overcome by lagging the 
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independent variables one-time period. We also calibrate the explanatory variables so they 
continue to capture the important financial performance indications given in the DuPont 
deconstruction while not being identical to elements in DuPont system. 3  The details of the 
construction calibration of the financial ratios are provided is described in the following section.  
Substituting equation (6) in (5) and interacting the financial covariates 𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 with 
binary variable 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 yield: 
𝛿𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾0𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 + 𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1𝑘≠0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗𝐾𝑘=1 + 𝜌𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 . (7)  
Different financial efficiency measures may have different impacts on firms’ optimal leverage 
decision that are of different organizational structures. Thus interaction terms between financial 
covariates and firm type can capture these differences.   
A short coming of random effect specification is the underlying assumption that 
unobserved individual specific characteristics is not correlated with the included explanatory 
variables, i.e. 𝐸[𝜌𝑗�𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1� = 0 (Greene). Otherwise fixed effect specification may seem 
appropriate but then we couldn’t estimate 𝛾𝑘’s in equation (7), which are the key interests in this 
paper. So we address this issue by imposing additional structures on 𝜌𝑗. As mentioned before, 
theory suggests that 𝜌𝑗 captures the business risk and firm’s attitude towards risk as well as all 
other unobserved firm’s specific attributes. Thus we can express 𝜌𝑗 as: 
𝜌𝑗 = 𝜉𝑗 + 𝛼𝑍𝑗 ,                        (8) 
where 𝜉𝑗 captures the individual business risk each firm faces and all other unobserved firm’s 
specific characteristics. Our data consists of cooperatives and IOFs in the same industry in a 
relatively small geographic area.  Since these firms operate in the same market, it’s a reasonable 
assumption that the unobservable business risk is faced equally by all firms in the data, i.e.  
𝐸[𝜉𝑗|�𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1� = 0. 𝛼𝑍𝑗 represents risk attitude of firm j which depends linearly on firm’s wealth 
level 𝑍𝑗. In our data, 𝑍𝑗 is represented by the value of fixed asset. In the expected utility theory, 
unless the utility function is specified as constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), which is hardly 
observed empirically, the risk aversion level is varied with one’s wealth level. It would be 
farfetched if firm’s risk attitude is assumed to be uncorrelated with financial covariates. Instead, 
33 Seminar participants at NCERA 210 rightly identified that without this calibration, the estimation is of an 
identity.  The calibration to the explanatory variables eliminates this concern. 
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we can substitute equation (7) into (8) and 𝛼𝑍𝑗 will capture the variation of risk attitudes across 
firms: 
𝛿𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛾0𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 + 𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1𝑘≠0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗𝐾𝑘=1 + 𝛼𝑍𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡 .  
 (9)  
 An alternative specification of regression (9) is to add quadratic forms of the financial 
covariates to recognize the  “sticky” nature of change in capital structure.    
𝛿𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛼𝛽0 + 𝛾0𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 + 𝐼𝐶𝑗,𝑡+ ∑ 𝛽𝑘𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1𝑘≠0 + ∑ 𝛾𝑘𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗𝐾𝑘=1 + ∑ 𝛾2𝑘𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−12 ∙𝐾𝑘=1
𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗 + 𝛼𝑍𝑗 + 𝜉𝑗 + 𝜀𝑗,𝑡  ,                    (10) 
and the marginal effects take the form:  
𝜕𝛿𝑗,𝑡
𝜕𝐹𝑘𝑗,𝑡−1 = 𝛽𝑘 + 𝛾𝑘𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗+2𝛾2𝑘𝐹𝑗,𝑘,𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑗       (11) 
Clearly, the empirical specification (10) allows the marginal impact of any financial measures on 
capital structure to be limited by the past performance.  
 Based on prior theoretical and empirical investigations in the literature, the effect of firm 
type on capital structure is ambiguous. Our testable hypotheses are based on two distinct schools 
of co-op theories, co-op financial constraint hypothesis and co-op equity constraint hypothesis. 
Our regression model lends us the unique advantage of understand the source of difference in 
capital structure between co-op and IOF without making a prior assumption regarding co-op’s 
objective. These hypotheses are summarized in table 3. If the financial constraint hypothesis 
holds for cooperatives, they rely more heavily on equity than debt to finance growth and therefore 
the debt-to-asset ratio of cooperatives should be more sensitive to interest rate changes relative to 
IOFs because of less portion of debt in their capital structure. We would also expect that any 
improvement in operating efficiency particularly regarding generating cash flow would lower the 
debt level of cooperatives for the difficulty in accessing the risky capital implying higher cost of 
borrowing.  However, on the other hand, if cooperatives were not able to obtain sufficient equity 
funds from patron members, the limiting pool of potential equity investors due to cooperatives’ 
user-owner principle may imply more debt financing. This situation is often referred to the equity 
constraint hypothesis of cooperatives and describes a much distinct situation from the prior. As 
for inventory management, we don't expect there is any difference between co-ops and IOFs as to 
how they might impact capital structure since these two entities are very similar in functions. If 
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it's more difficult for one firm to finance this type of daily operations than others in such a 
competitive market, this firm may not survive.    
The comparison of financing behavior of cooperatives and IOFs is rather puzzling from a 
theory perspective. In the next section, we first compare the debt to asset ratios of cooperatives to 
IOFs and analyze empirically the potential operating factors that may play a role in driving the 
difference in capital structures between the two entities, if there is any. 
Data 
The data are a panel of annual accounting information for  approximately 100 agricultural 
grain marketing and supply co-ops and 50 IOFs in Iowa from 1992 – 1995 collected by survey on 
annual basis.  Random sample of firms was selected from the population of facilities licensed 
with the Iowa Grain and Feed Association.  Financial data were provided by the Grain Warehouse 
Bureau after firm identifying information was removed (Ginder and Baumler, 1997).  Table 1 
summarizes the accounting information of firms in our dataset which is used to construct the 
financial ratios.  Based on average asset size and annual sales, the cooperatives in our sample are 
on average larger than the IOFs.  
Table 2 provides descriptions of the variables used in this analysis and the estimation for 
equation (5) which compares the average capital structure and financial efficiencies between co-
ops and IOFs. For purposes here, capital structure is measured as the ratio of total liability to total 
asset. We leave out the firms with debt-to-asset ratio greater one because the interpretations of 
efficiency measures are not straight forward for firms with negative equity. This procedure is 
done for 3 observations. Cooperative firms in our sample have a lower debt to asset ratio than do 
investor owned firms. This observation is consistent with many previous findings while it 
couldn’t serve as an evidence of cooperatives’ financial constraint hypothesis for other operating 
factors could result in co-op’s lower leverage besides difficulty in access the risky capital.  
A firm’s operating efficiencies are reflected in profit margin and asset turnover. Margin  
is the ratio of taxable income to total revenue; taxable income is used instead of pretax profits 
because of the differential tax treatment cooperatives received that IOFs do not. Cooperatives’ 
profits are generally only taxed once at either the entity or member level where IOF profits are 
taxed at both the entity level and investor level when distributed as dividends.  Interest expense is 
tax deductible; therefore, IOFs may have a stronger incentive to use debt financing relative to 
cooperatives.  Also, using pretax profit margins isolate a firm’s profitability from the effect of tax 
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treatment and permits the assumption that firms optimize based on their tax situations. In our 
sample, cooperatives have a higher margin on average than the IOFs which is a reflection of 
economy of scales as co-ops are larger in asset size and farmers are benefited from the 
cooperative’s larger competitive yardstick. Figure 1 plots the profit margin against capital 
structure for co-ops and IOFs which exhibits a negative relationship for both organizational types. 
However, how this margin-leverage relationship might differ between co-ops and IOFs is hard to 
visualize.  Asset turnover (ATO) is the ratio of sales (excluding non-operating income from total 
revenue) to total assets. Average cost of debt is the ratio of annual interest expense to total 
liability. IOFs appear to be much more efficient likely due to the diminishing margin effect of 
asset size on asset turnover. Figure 2 plots the asset turnover against capital structure and there is 
no obvious relationship can be visualized from the graph. 
 A firm's liability generally consists of short term debt and long term debt as well as other 
accounts payables. Interest rates on debt with different duration ought to be different thus a 
measure of average cost of total liability which is commonly used in the literature, doesn’t 
provide an accurate picture of firm’s cost of borrowing and adds noise in the analysis. Instead, we 
use interest coverage ratio defined as profit before tax and interest expense divided by interest 
expense to measure the ability of firms to meet their ongoing debt obligations. Co-ops on average 
generates more free cash flow after interest expense as compared with IOFs but there is lots 
of variability as shown in figure3, and such difference is not significant. Figure 4 plots the 
inventory to current asset ratio against capital structure and there is positive relationship observed 
for both co-ops and IOFs which is expected.  
 
Estimation  
We estimate equation (6) using a random effects model to exploit the panel nature of our data 
and to control for unobserved firm-specific characteristics4.   We focus on whether and to what 
extent capital structures of cooperatives and IOFs are affected by the four financial and efficiency 
measures: profit margin, asset turnover, liquidity ratio and effective interest rate.  We also 
compare the marginal impact of these financial measures on capital structure between coops and 
IOFs.  Table 2 presents the results. It is consistent with our observation that cooperatives are less 
4  The Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects  indicates that random effects is 
preferred over OLS, while the Hausman test indicates that a fixed effect model  is preferable to random 
effects. However it assumes all individual characteristics are captured in the unique intercept which will not 
allow us to compare the differences among the marginal impact of financial measures on capital structure 
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leveraged than their counterpart IOFs, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on 
typejt. As mentioned previously, inventory management affects the same period debt to asset ratio 
as the operating activities associated with managing inventory requires short term borrowing. The 
empirical results suggest that for both cooperatives and IOFs, greater inventory to current asset 
ratio results in higher leverage; however cooperatives are more sensitive to inventory-related 
changes than are IOF’s.  That means for additional units of inventory per unit of current assets, 
coops borrow more to finance the inventory than do IOFs. From the perspective of past operating 
factors, Cooperatives appear to increase debt usage as they become more efficient in managing 
sales generated from their assets. This conforms with the functionality of cooperatives since the 
more capable the cooperatives are of generating sales, the better they are at helping patron 
members gain access to the output market. The leverage effect will simply increase the sales by 
allowing the cooperatives to either invest more in capital such as machineries or storage 
capacities in the long run, or just simply manage to purchase more product from members in the 
near term. Combining this finding with the impact of inventory to current ratio on capital 
structure, the latter case seems more plausible. However, in order to generate a competitive return 
on owner’s equity, asset turnover must also be paired up with profit margin. The empirical result 
suggests that higher profit margins, which ceteris paribus, imply firm are able to generate more 
internal cash flow result in deleveraging activities for both firm types. In other words, firms tend 
to rely more on equity financing as they become more profitable. There is no significant 
difference between coops and IOFs in this regard. Finally we found that even with lower average 
cost of debt, cooperatives’ debt-to-asset ratios respond negatively to the cost of borrowing, while 
there is no significant effect of interest rates on the debt-to-asset ratio for IOFs in our sample.  
This may lend support the hypothesis that cooperatives may face greater difficulty accessing the 
external capital market relative to similar IOFs. However, since the cooperatives capital structure 
tends to be more related to short term operating activities as discussed earlier and  the effective 
interest rate only is only lagged one time period which may only capture the rate change in the 
short run, one might suspect that cooperatives are only short term  financially constraint but the 
impact of long term borrowing on capital structure is unidentified. 
To investigate this further, we add a measure of debt structure (the ratio of long term 
liabilities to current liabilities) to our model.  Table 3 presents the results. Comparing to table 2, 
the marginal effects are robust to the change in specification. Comparing the estimates of debt 
structure between coops and IOFs, we see that as long term liability increases relative to current 
liability, the debt-to-asset ratio increases for IOFs, which is intuitive (i.e. borrow to finance a long 
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term project). However, the marginal impact of debt structure on capital structure is negative for 
coops, suggesting that when coops finance a long term investment using equity and debt, they 
would raise significant more equity than debt.  This is a strong evidence that explains supports 
our belief that coops rely mainly on equity fund rather than debt to finance the long-lived capital 
assets or coops may just take a conservative investment strategy to extended that fixed assets can 
be financed with available equity (Lerman and Parliament, 1993).  
 
Conclusion 
Utilizing panel data of agricultural grain and supply firms in Iowa, we find that ownership 
structure does impact the operating capital structure of a firm. Our empirical findings have shown 
that cooperatives are less leveraged as compared with IOFs but the evidences that lend support to 
the financial constraint hypothesis of cooperatives are mixed. That is cooperatives may face 
higher borrowing cost in the short term but not necessarily in the long run. Given the size of 
cooperatives, it’s understandable that the marginal cost of borrowing is higher when the short 
term loans in most cases are only backed by the full faith of borrower. However, from a long run 
perspective, the company usually borrows money to expand business or build a new project. In 
these situations, the loan is backed by collateral (the fixed asset of a project etc.) and the loan will 
only cover part of the project’s expense. Even in case of default, the lenders (or bond holders) 
will always be the primary claimer of firm’s liquidated assets regardless of the organizational 
structure of a firm since the equity members will always be the residual claimers. So the lender 
usually is faced with limited risk and the covenants on a loan are determined case by case. The 
fact cooperatives carry with more short term debt than long term may be explained by the horizon 
problem: the empirical result suggests that cooperatives are more likely to follow a conservative 
investment strategy by using more equity to finance long lived asset, but the older member is not 
likely benefited from investment of cooperatives’ long term projects since the equity is illiquid 
and she may no longer patronize with cooperatives before the return on investment is realized.  
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Table 1.  Description of Variables  
  Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms 
Variable  Description Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev. 
Ajt Total Assets  $8,500,646 $1,020,000 $1,770,871 $2,238,160 
Djt Total Liabilities $4,246,756 $4,595,540 $ 958,909 $1,198,911 
Πjt Pre-tax Profit $335,814.3   $430,734.9 $44,549.02 $124,968.4   
Revjt Total Revenue $2,110,000 $2,530,000 $6,830,383 $7,454,138 
Sjt 
Sales (Revenue – non-operating 
income) $20,100,000 $24,700,000 $6,687,238 $7,320,792 
Intjt Annual Interest Expense $156,996.4 $159,655 $45,736.33 $61,475.39 
CAjt Current Assets $4,856,792 $8,635,551 $1,098,971 $1,222,467 
Invjt Inventory $2,941,892 $3,210,552 $551,073.6 $841,635.3 
LTDjt Long Term Liabilities $621,783.7 $987,774.8 $243,728.7 $430,761.1 
CLjt Current Liabilities $3,624,972 $3,900,748 $715,180.9 $882,876.6 
 
Table 2. Constructed Ratios 
  Cooperatives Investor-Owned Firms 
 
Ratios Definition Mean Mean Difference 
𝛿𝑗𝑡  Debt to Asset Ratio = 𝐷𝑗𝑡/𝐴𝑗𝑡;  0.468 0.519 -0.052* 
marginjt Profit Margin = 𝜋𝑗𝑡  𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑗𝑡⁄ ;  0.018 0.011 0.007*** 
ATOjt Asset Turnover = 𝑆𝑗𝑡  𝐴𝑗𝑡⁄  2.467 5.115 -2.648*** 
Liqjt Liquidity = 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑗𝑡 𝐶𝐴𝑗𝑡⁄  0.605 0.434 0.170*** 
i
jt
 i
jt
 
 
 Interest coverage ratio= 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑗𝑡  𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑗𝑡�  15.824 6.597 9.228 
DebtStr
jt Debt Structure = 𝐿𝑇𝐷𝑗𝑡/𝐶𝐷𝑗𝑡 0.157 .477 -0.290*** 
Notes: Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3. Constructed Ratios 
Ratios Co-op Financial Constraint 
Hypothesis 
Co-op Equity Constraint 
Hypothesis 
 Co-ops vs. IOFs Co-ops vs. IOFs 
Debt/Asset Lower Higher 
The impact of financial efficiencies on capital structure 
Margin Negative Positive 
ATO Negative Positive 
Liquidity No difference No difference 
ICR Negative Positive 
Debt Structure Positive Positive 
 
Figure 1 Capital structure vs. Profit Margin 
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Figure 2 Capital structure vs. asset turnover 
 
Figure 3 Capital structure vs. Interest Coverage ratio 
 
 
21 
 
Figure 4 Capital structure vs. liquidity 
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Table 2. Estimated Marginal Effects on Capital Structure from a Random Effects Model by Firm Type 
 Cooperatives Investor Owned Firms Difference 
Type ????    
marginjt 
-1.739*** 
(0.002) 
-1.244** 
(0.028) 
-0.496 
(0.503) 
ATOjt 
0.018* 
(0.071) 
-0.003 
(0.294) 
0.022** 
(0.041) 
Liqjt 
0.347*** 
(0.000) 
0.169*** 
(0.002) 
0.179** 
(0.019) 
ijt 
-0.827** 
(0.034) 
-0.041 
(0.804) 
-0.786** 
(0.021) 
Notes: Marginal effects estimated from a random effects model on debt to asset ratio. p-values in parentheses. Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. 
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Table 3. Estimated Marginal Effects on Capital Structure from a Random Effects Model by Firm Type 
 Cooperatives Investor Owned Firms Difference 
Type ????    
marginjt 
-1.819*** 
(0.00) 
-1.136* 
(0.041) 
-0.683 
(0.347) 
ATOjt 
0.021** 
(0.034) 
-0.004 
(0.209) 
0.025** 
(0.016) 
Liqjt 
0.349*** 
(0.000) 
0.206*** 
(0.006) 
0.144** 
(0.056) 
ijt 
-0.811 
(0.327) 
-0.058 
(0.724) 
-0.753** 
(0.025) 
DebtStrjt 
-0.060** 
(0.040) 
0.061*** 
(0.000) 
-0.121*** 
(0.000) 
Notes: Marginal effects estimated from a random effects model on debt to asset ratio. p-values in parentheses. Significance levels indicated as: * p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01.
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